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1. Introduction			 Propensities,	or	chancy	dispositions,	are	back	on	the	agenda	in	both	the	philosophy	of	science	and	metaphysics.	They	also	figure	in	unsuspected	ways	in	the	methodologies	of	statistical	and	causal	inference	(Humphreys	[1989]).	And	they	implicitly	or	explicitly	also	appear	in	our	ordinary	ways	of	talking	and	thinking	about	chancy	phenomena.	We	often	say	that	a	particular	coin	has	some	propensity	to	land	heads,	or	tails;	that	a	radium	atom	has	a	certain	propensity	to	decay	within	the	hour;	that	a	particular	individual	has	a	propensity	to	smoke,	and	that	smoking	has	a	propensity	to	cause	lung	cancer,	etc.	In	all	these	expressions,	a	is	the	propensity	property	of	the	object	or	chance	set	up,	and	b	is	whatever	property	manifests	it	–	i.e.	let	us	refer	to	it	as	the	manifestation	property.	The	manifestation	of	a	propensity	is	essentially	probabilistic:	A	coin	is	fair,	or	loaded,	and	this	property	of	the	coin	is	displayed	in	each	toss	in	a	particular	chance	of	heads	or	tails.		The	relevant	relation	is	therefore	between	a	propensity	a,	and	the	single-case	chance	over	the	manifestation	property,	Prob	(b),	or	Ch	(b),	that	displays	the	propensity.	1			 This	essay	provides	the	outline	of	a	new	account	of	propensities	in	their	relation	to	chances.	Traditionally	defenders	of	propensities	have	tended	to	understand	“propensity”	and	“objective	probability”	as	roughly	interchangeable	terms.	On	this	view,	propensities	merely	provide	a	model	or	interpretation	for	probabilities.	Following	an	influential	argument	due	to	Paul	Humphreys	([1985],	[2004]),	a	number	of	philosophers	have	argued	that	this	is	a	mistake.	An	appropriate	and	fully	explanatory	philosophical	account	of	physical	probability	and	chancy	phenomena	requires	these	two	concepts	(“propensity”	and	“chance”)	to	be	kept	distinct.	These	two	concepts	must	moreover	be	each	kept	distinct	from																																																									1	In	this	essay	I	do	not	essentially	distinguish	‘chances’	from	the	objective	probabilities	that	represent	them.	Sometimes	the	distinction	is	drawn	in	the	literature	between	chances	as	metaphysical	qualitative	entities,	and	probabilities	as	formal	quantitative	ones.	I	draw	the	distinction	elsewhere,	since	I	reserve	the	terms	‘propensity’	for	qualitative	properties	or	entities,	‘chance’	for	quantitative	ones,	and	‘objective	probability’	for	the	formal	representation	of	the	latter.		
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the	further	notion	of	actual	(finite)	frequency.		Propensities	explain	and	ground	single	case	objective	chances;	chances	are	represented	as	probabilities	in	statistical	models;	and	these	models	are	in	turn	tested	by	frequency	ratios	in	sequences	of	experimental	outcomes.	I	shall	here	assume	the	need	for	a	tripartite	distinction	along	these	lines,	and	shall	in	this	paper	focus	mainly	upon	the	relation	between	propensities	and	the	single-case	chances	that	display	them.	I	will	have	very	little	to	say	about	their	links	to	frequency	ratios	in	experimental	statistics.			 The	focus	is	therefore	squarely	on	the	connection	between	on	the	one	hand	propensities	understood	as	dispositional	properties	of	objects,	systems,	or	chance	set	ups,	2	and	on	the	other	hand	chances,	understood	as	the	objective	probability	distributions	that	these	propensities	give	rise	to	every	time	they	are	exercised.	The	relationship	between	such	propensities	and	the	chances	that	they	bring	about	is	thus	to	be	understood	on	the	model	of	the	‘manifestation’	relation	in	the	metaphysics	of	dispositions.	However,	propensities	are	inherently	probabilistic	or	chancy	dispositions,	which	means	that	there	must	be	some	irreducibly	chancy	element	that	marks	them	out	from	ordinary,	sure-fire	or	deterministic,	dispositions.	3		Certainly,	chances	are	peculiar	manifestation	properties;	it	is	in	fact	best	to	describe	objective	chances	as	‘displays’	over	the	actual	manifestation	property.	Thus	I	shall	say	that	propensities	–	unlike	sure-fire	or	deterministic	dispositions	–	are	displayed	in	chances	over	the	different	possible	values	of	some	manifestation	property	(or	perhaps	more	simply	its	various	manifestation	properties).	Thus	a	coin’s	propensity	to	land	heads	is	displayed	in	a	chance	(prob	=	½	if	the	coin	is	fair)	of	manifesting	heads	each	time	it	is	tossed	under	normal	conditions.	The	radium	atom	has	a	certain	half-life	x,	a	propensity	which	is	displayed	in	a	probability	or	chance	½	to	manifest	decay	within	a	certain	period	of																																																									2	The	question	of	what	properties	of	what	systems	precisely	constitute	propensities	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	essay.	Addressing	it	would	require	both	a	minimal	metaphysics	of	properties,	and	empirical	research	into	the	particular	systems	in	hand.	My	hope	is	to	stay	neutral	in	particular	on	the	question	as	to	whether	it	is	just	objects,	or	entire	experimental	setups	that	are	the	recipients	of	propensities.	So	I	shall	refer	to	both	ambiguously	as	“chance	setups”.	See	Hacking	([1965],	Ch.2)	for	further	discussion.	3	In	other	words,	a	property	is	a	probabilistic	disposition	–	propensity	-		if	its	manifestation	is	‘chancy’:	the	disposition	is	displayed	in	a	chance	or	probability	distribution	over	the	values	of	the	manifestation	property.	
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time	x.	Etc.		I	shall	therefore	assume	that	at	least	some	chances	are	the	displays	of	underlying	propensities;	the	question	is	then	how	to	best	formally	model	this	‘displaying’	relation.			 A	couple	of	caveats	are	in	order.	Firstly,		notice	that	the	discussion	is	restricted	to	the	relation	between	the	propensities	of	chancy	objects	or	setups,	on	the	one	hand,	and	their	displays	in	chances	or	probability	distributions,	on	the	other.	There	is	in	the	vicinity	yet	another	interesting	question	regarding	the	relation	between	these	chances	and	the	relative	frequencies	of	outcomes	in	long	run	experiments	performed	on	such	objects	or	setups.	That	is,	in	addition	to	the	question	regarding	the	relation	between	the	propensities	of	a	coin	and	its,	say,	½	chance	of	landing	heads	or	tails,	there	is	the	question	regarding	the	relation	of	those	chances	to	the	relative	frequencies	of	actual	outcomes	of	tossing	the	coin.	This	is	of	course	a	long-established	topic	of	discussion	over	which	there	has	been	much	debate,	and	it	may	be	supposed	that	a	propensity	interpretation	of	chances	must	be	called	in	to	account	for	this	latter	relation.	We	know	from	the	law	of	large	numbers	that	in	the	long	run	the	frequencies	will	approximate	the	chances	arbitrarily	with	high	probability	–	and	it	may	well	be	that	this	‘higher-level’	probability	must	receive	a	propensity	interpretation.	Nevertheless,	these	are	at	least	prima	facie	distinct	questions,	and	it	is	the	question	of	the	relation	of	propensities	to	chances	that	will	be	addressed	here.	4			 Secondly,	and	related,	the	phrasing	of	the	question	above	may	suggest	that	the	relation	between	propensities	and	chances	is	in	fact	deterministic.	It	may	suggest	that	the	propensities	determine	the	chances	with	certainty.	Thus	the	propensities	of	the	coin	determine	with	certainty	that	the	chance	of	landing	heads	if	tossed	is	exactly	½.	There	is	a	long	and	distinguished	tradition	that	assumes	that	objective	chances	are	the	probabilistic	outcomes	of	deterministic	processes	acting																																																									4	On	matters	of	the	interpretation	of	the	chance	or	probability	functions,	I	shall	adopt	an	agnostic	attitude	–	or	a	no-theory	theory	approach	similar	to	that	defended	by	Elliott	Sober	(2004).	I	believe	that	nothing	that	I	say	in	this	paper	is	reliant	upon	any	particular	interpretation	of	the	chance	or	probability	functions,	including	Popper’s	(1959)	propensity	interpretation	of	probability.	My	assumption	is	that	far	from	interpreting	objective	probabilities,	propensities	are	in	the	business	of	explaining	at	least	some	of	those	probabilities.		
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over	randomly	distributed	initial	conditions	–	the	so-called	method	of	arbitrary	functions,	originating	in	Poincaré,	Von	Kries,	etc.	5	As	far	as	I	can	tell,	everything	in	this	paper	is	consistent	with	the	assumption,	and	the	account	defended	may	thus	be	run	as	a	complement	to	this	tradition.	Yet,	the	assumption	is	not	required,	and	nothing	in	the	account	demands	underlying	determinism.	The	probabilities	or	chances	may	instead	simply	mediate	between	propensities	and	outcomes.	The	propensities	of	the	coin	are	thus	in	some	sense	responsible	for	the	outcome	(‘heads’	or	‘tails’)	with	a	certain	probability	or	chance.	On	this	conception	the	propensities	determine	the	outcomes	only	up	to	a	certain	probability.	There	is	no	need	to	appeal	to	any	underlying	determinism,	since	only	one	amongst	all	the	possible	outcomes	happens	as	a	matter	of	fact.	Either	conception	(‘propensities	determine	chances	of	outcomes	with	certainty’,	or	‘propensities	determine	outcomes	with	some	probability’)	seems	legitimate,	and	in	agreement	with	our	ordinary	modal	locutions	regarding	chance,	including	what	we	ordinarily	seem	to	mean	by	‘propensity’.	6	A	good	account	of	chancy	propensities	should	be	able	to	accommodate	both.			 Section	2	explores	two	models	or	accounts	for	the	primary	relation	of	propensities	and	chances	in	terms	of	conditionals,	and	conditional	probabilities	respectively.	These	accounts	have	in	common	a	critical	reliance	on	some	notion	of	‘conditionality’,	in	the	form	of	either	a	conditional	statement	or	conditional	probability.	It	is	argued	that	the	first	account	in	terms	of	conditionals	confronts	important	semantic	objections,	while	the	second	in	terms	of	conditional	probability	confronts	what	is	known	as	‘Humphreys’	paradox’.	Section	3	presents	the	new	account	in	terms	of	unconditional	indexed	probabilities	and	argues	that	it	overcomes	the	difficulties	that	make	its	competitors	untenable.	Section	4	compares	the	account	with	recent	similar	views	in	the	literature,	and	argues	against	a	Humean	version.	Section	5	reviews	in	some	detail	further	features	and	advantages																																																									5	See	Von	Plato	(1983)	for	an	historical	account	and	review.		6	There	is	in	addition	the	view	that	some	propensities	determine	the	chances	that	display	them	only	probabilistically.	This	seems	to	pile	up	probabilities,	thus	providing	a	circular	definition	of	the	relation	of	propensities	to	probabilities,	but	the	circularity	is	arguably	not	vicious	if	the	higher-order	probability	is	not	itself	to	be	explained	as	the	exercise	of	any	propensity.	At	any	rate,	for	the	sake	of	simplicity,	I	leave	this	option	out	of	the	discussion.		
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of	the	indexed	probability	account	of	propensities	and	chance	phenomena,	and	applies	it	in	the	resolution	of	a	number	of	different	conundrums	regarding	chance.	The	final	section	6	discusses	the	ways	in	which	propensities	may	be	said	to	ground	chances	according	to	the	indexed	probability	account,	as	well	as	the	extent	to	which	the	account	may	be	said	to	provide	an	indexical	-	or	perspectival	-	account	of	chance	in	general.				
2. Conditional	Accounts			 This	section	critically	assesses	two	accounts	of	the	relation	of	propensities	and	chances	in	terms	of	conditionals,	and	conditional	probability,	respectively.	We	may	refer	to	(either	of)	them	as	‘conditionality’	accounts,	yet	these	accounts	differ	from	each	other	in	critical	ways,	which	are	very	much	worth	exploring.	The	first	one	conceives	the	relation	between	propensities	and	chances	as	essentially	a	logical	or	propositional	relation	between	two	statements	–	specifically	the	relation	between	a	conditional’s	antecedent	and	its	consequent.	7	Probabilities	play	no	essential	role	in	this	relation,	which	can	be	understood	and	analyzed	irrespective	of	the	calculus	of	probability.	On	the	second	account,	by	contrast	the	relation	between	propensities	and	chances	is	itself	probabilistic	in	nature,	and	the	logic	of	conditional	statements	plays	no	essential	role.	The	‘conditionality’	aspect	in	this	latter	view	is	rather	built	into	the	probability	functions	themselves,	since	propensities	appear	as	conditional	variables	within	the	chance	functions.		Hence	the	nature	of	the	‘conditionality’	of	chances	upon	propensities	is	fundamentally	different	in	these	accounts.	Nonetheless,	there	is	something	that	both	views	share,	namely	the	thought	that	whatever	the	nature	of	the	‘conditionality’	of	chances	upon	propensities,	this	‘conditionality’	is	an	intrinsic	part	of	the	relation	that	links																																																									7	Throughout	the	essay	I	move	liberally	between	a	language	of	propensity	and	manifestation	properties,	a	language	of	events	(‘the	obtaining	of	a	certain	value	of	a	certain	property’)	or	corresponding	propositions	(‘the	proposition	that	a	certain	property	takes	a	certain	value’),	and	a	language	of	variables	representing	said	properties	taking	certain	values,	which	in	the	limit	reduce	to	0	or	1	depending	on	whether	the	property	obtains	or	not.		
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propensities	to	their	displays,	and	it	must	therefore	be	made	formally	explicit.	I	shall	argue	that	‘intrinsic	conditionality’	ultimately	fails,	because	it	generates	insurmountable	problems	for	any	account	of	propensities	in	relation	to	the	chancy	displays	over	their	manifestations.	Although	conditional	chances	do	of	course	exist	and	may	be	well	defined,	the	relation	between	propensities	and	the	single	case	chances	that	display	them	is	not	in	general	provided	by	any	‘conditionality’.			
2.1. Conditionals			 The	first	account	assumes	that	the	relation	between	a	propensity	a	and	its	manifestation	property	b	is	given	by	either	an	indicative	or	a	subjunctive	(counterfactual)	conditional:	‘if	a	then	b’,	or	‘were	a	to	be	the	case	then	b’.	In	the	case	of	propensities,	the	manifestation	property	obtains	with	a	certain	probability	–	and	is	thus	displayed	in	a	distribution	function	over	the	outcome	variables	Prob	
(b)	for	all	outcomes	b.	Thus	the	simplest	model	would	assume	that	a	propensity	property	relates	to	its	probabilistic	manifestation	as	follows:	If	a	then	Prob	(b)	(where	Prob	(b)	is	the	full	distribution	function	over	outcomes):	‘If	the	coin	is	fair	then	the	probability	of	landing	heads	is	½	and	the	probability	of	landing	tails	is	½’;	‘if	the	material	is	made	of	radium,	then	the	probability	that	it	will	decay	during	the	next	hour	is	0.10’;	Etc.			 Hugh	Mellor	([2005],	pp.	53ff.)	has	proposed	a	conditional	account	of	the	relation	between	single	case	chances	of	events	and	frequency	statistics	observed	over	those	very	events.	Regardless	of	its	merits	this	account	may	be	considered	as	a	model	for	the	different	relation	between	propensities	and	chances.	Take	the	well-known	example	of	radioactive	decay.	Suppose	that	radium	atoms	have	a	chance	pt	of	decaying	within	t	years,	where	pt	is	well	known	to	be	the	inverse	of	an	exponential	function	of	time,	such	as:	 𝑃! = 1− 𝑒!!" .	Consider	then	the	law:	
€ 
∀x : Rx →Ch Dt x( ) = p( ),	where	Rx	denotes	that	x	is	a	radium	atom,	and	Ch	(Dt	x)	denotes	the	chance	of	x	decaying	in	t	years.	This	law	seems	to	appropriately	encapsulate	the	relation	between	the	propensities	in	radium	atoms	and	their	manifested	chances	of	decay.		It	is	typically	assumed	that	there	is	a	reductive	basis	
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to	propensities,	such	that,	say,	a	radium	atom	possesses	a	certain	propensity	to	decay	within	an	hour	if	it	is	endowed	with	a	number	of	fundamental	categorical	properties	that	provide	a	reductive	basis	for	it.	Thus	in	the	case	of	the	radium	atom,	its	having	a	chance	
€ 
Ch Dt x( ) 	of	decay	is	identified	with	its	‘having	some	categorical	basis	(such	as	a	nuclear	structure)	for	a	disposition	to	produce	a	hypothetical	limiting	frequency	pt	of	similar	R-atoms	decaying	within	t	years’	(Mellor	[2005],	p.	54).	The	assumption	that	there	is	such	a	categorical	basis	may	be	contested.	It	is	particularly	inappropriate	in	the	case	of	quantum	mechanics,	as	applied	to	the	most	fundamental	constituents	of	nature,	since	at	that	level	there	is	no	further	level	downwards	to	reduce	dispositional	properties	to.	Yet,	it	turns	out	to	be	an	unnecessary	assumption	in	this	context	anyway.	The	disposition	may	produce	the	frequency	without	any	recourse	to	the	categorical	basis,	and	we	may	simply	insist	that	the	law	
€ 
∀x Rx →Ch Dt x( ) = pt( ) 	holds,	where	we	now	assume	that	‘R’	denotes	merely	the	possession	of	the	relevant	disposition	whether	or	not	this	is	reducible	to	a	categorical	basis.				 We	can	thus	turn	without	further	ado	to	the	fundamental	issue	of	the	form	of	the	law	that,	on	this	account,	links	propensities	with	their	chancy	manifestations,	regardless	of	issues	of	reduction.	Mellor	does	not	stipulate	the	nature	of	the	relation	→	other	than	it	is	to	be	understood	as	the	conditional	‘if	R	(x)	then	
€ 
Ch Dt x( ) = pt ’.	Therefore,	this	law	has	exactly	the	form	advertised	for	the	relation	of	a	propensity	to	its	chancy	manifestations.	In	particular,	for	any	chance	set	up	x	it	must	be	the	case	that	‘if	x	has	a	then	Prob	(b)=	y’	is	true,	where	a	is	the	obtaining	of	the	propensity	for	x	and	Prob	(b)	=	y	is	the	probability	over	the	relevant	manifestation	property.	The	only	provisos	seem	to	be	that	i)	the	probability	is	understood	to	define	a	particular	chance	value	over	the	manifestation	properties,	and	ii)	the	manifestation	property	is	suitably	time-indexed.	Nothing	of	any	fundamental	importance	depends	on	these	provisos	(other	than	perhaps	the	assumption	that	chances	are	indeed	probabilities),	and	we	are	still	left	with	the	task	of	understanding	the	fundamental	nature	of	the	conditional	that	obtains	between	propensities	and	their	displays.		
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	 The	difficulties	with	the	semantics	of	conditionals	are	well	known	(see	Edgington	[2004]).	Roughly	there	are	three	accounts:	i)	Truth-functional;	ii)	Non-truth	functional;	and	iii)	Suppositional	accounts.	I	will	here	raise	two	types	of	difficulty	for	all	of	them.	Firstly,	some	general	difficulties	related	to	the	semantics	for	conditionals	that	they	presuppose;	secondly,	specific	difficulties	with	their	application	to	propensities	in	particular.	The	main	instance	of	i)	is	material	implication,	according	to	which	the	conditional	‘if	a	then	b’	is	false	only	if	‘a’	is	true	and	‘b’	is	false,	and	otherwise	it	is	always	true.	Most	of	the	problems	with	this	account	are	related	to	cases	in	which	the	antecedent	is	false.	As	regards	propensities,	in	particular,	it	would	be	very	strange	that	if	an	object	lacks	any	propensity	then	it	is	true	of	any	of	these	(absent)	propensities	that	it	entails	the	actual	chances,	regardless	of	what	these	chances	are.	Any	coin	that	for	whatever	reason	cannot	be	tossed	is	such	that	the	coin’s	non-propensities	would	entail	any	chance	distribution	over	heads	or	tails.	This	is	not	normally	the	way	we	speak	about	dispositional	properties	in	general,	never	mind	propensities.				 By	contrast,	on	non-truth	functional	accounts,	which	apply	to	subjunctive	or	counterfactual	conditionals,	‘if	a	then	b’	may	well	be	false	when	‘a’	is	false.	For	instance,	according	to	the	influential	possible	world	semantics	(PWS),	the	conditional	‘if	a	then	b’	is	a	counterfactual	conditional	if	uttered	at	any	i-world	where	‘a’	is	not	the	case	–	and	it	is	then	made	true	or	false	by	facts	regarding	possible	worlds	close	enough	to	the	i-world.	On	Stalnaker’s	(1984)	version	–	which	obeys	both	a	uniqueness	and	a	limiting	assumption	regarding	‘close	worlds’	–,	this	counterfactual	conditional	is	true	at	such	an	i-world	if	b	is	true	at	the	a-world	(i.e.	the	possible	world	where	a	is	the	case)	closest	to	this	i-world.	The	virtue	of	the	account	is	that	there	is	no	general	truth-functional	compositional	rule	such	that	all	conditionals	with	false	antecedent	are	true:	Some	of	them	are	true	but	others	are	not,	depending	on	the	details	of	each	case.	So	it	is	not	necessarily	the	case	for	any	absent	propensity	that	it	entails	any	chance.	However,	such	an	account	has	other	problems	(see	Edgington	[2004],	pp.	7-8;	and	Lewis	[1973],	pp.	77ff).				 Stalnaker’s	limiting	assumption	entails	that	there	is	a	limit	to	the	order	of	closer	worlds	to	any	given	i-world,	so	that	there	exists	a	certain	world	W	such	that	
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no	other	world	is	closer	to	the	i-world	than	W.	The	uniqueness	assumption	picks	out	some	W	as	in	fact	the	closest	world	to	the	i-world,	and	Stalnaker	specifies	a	‘selection	function’	whose	role	is	to	determine	W.	But	why	should	there	be	a	uniquely	specifiable	world	that	is	closest	to	any	given	i-world?	And	if	so,	what	may	prevent	two	a-worlds	being	closest,	in	one	of	which	b	is	true	and	in	the	other	b	is	false?	If	this	cannot	be	ruled	out	then	it	follows	that,	in	general,	for	any	a	and	b,	the	truth-value	of	the	counterfactual	conditional	‘had	a	been	the	case	then	b’	is	undefined.	More	particularly,	for	the	conditional	account	of	the	relation	of	propensities	and	chances,	it	entails	that	there	is	no	way	to	decide,	for	any	propensity	statement	if	a	then	Prob	(b),	whether	or	not	in	worlds	where	a	is	not	the	case	Prob	(b)	is	the	chance	distribution	over	the	manifestation	property	variable	b.		In	other	words,	we	would	never	be	in	a	position	to	determine	in	advance	what	chances	properly	display	the	propensities	of	any	chance	setups.				 There	does	not	seem	to	be	much	hope	for	an	account	of	this	kind	to	explain	our	ordinary	locutions	and	elementary	beliefs	regarding	propensities,	if	these	are	understood	in	the	way	I	have	pointed	out	in	their	relation	to	chances.	This	is	because	so	understood	propensity	statements	are	irreducibly	modal	and	essentially	tied	to	their	chance	manifestations.	There	is	no	conceptual	room	to	ascribe	propensities	with	undefined	chance	displays;	and	it	is	irrelevant	whether	propensities	obtain	in	the	actual	world	or	not.	We	can	perfectly	imagine	a	biased	coin	with	a	propensity	precisely	displayed	as	a	chance	1/3	to	land	heads,	even	though	no	real	coin	in	the	actual	world	has	precisely	that	propensity.	A	counterfactual	analysis	of	such	propensity	ascriptions,	along	the	lines	suggested	by	Stalnaker’s	semantics,	does	not	yield	any	understanding	as	to	what	such	propensities	could	possibly	consist	in.	8	
																																																								8	Lewis	([1973],	3.4)	provides	an	alternative	account	which	rejects	both	the	uniqueness	and	the	limiting	assumptions	and	makes	no	use	of	any	selection	function.	Although	this	overcomes	some	of	the	problems	mentioned	in	the	text	and	is	a	more	promising	approach,	it	remains	problematic.	The	logic	that	results	does	not	support	conditional	excluded	middle,	so	it	is	not	true	for	any	propensity	a	and	manifestation	property	b	that	‘if	a	then	prob	(b)=	x	or	if	a	then	prob	(b)	≠	x’	for	any	value	x.	This	is	widely	regarded	as	a	problem	in	general	(e.g.	Swanson	[2011])	and	again	seems	if	anything	a	greater	problem	for	the	conditional	account	of	
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	 		 The	third	option	(iii)	for	understanding	conditionals	is	the	suppositional	account	suggested	in	some	of	Frank	Ramsey’s	writings	(Ramsey	[1927]).	However,	this	essentially	boils	down	to	the	idea	that	a	conditional	expresses	a	degree	of	belief	in	the	proposition	b	on	the	supposition	of	the	proposition	a.	This	is	in	other	words	the	second	conditionality	account	in	terms	of	conditional	probability,	which	I	turn	to	next.			
2.2. Conditional	probability		 The	second	conditional	account	assumes	that	the	relation	between	propensity	properties	and	manifestation	properties	is	provided	by	conditional	Kolmogorov	probability:	Prob	(b/a).		In	our	example,	a	fair	coin	possesses	a	propensity	(a)	to	land	heads	(b)	with	chance	½	if	and	only	if	Prob	(b	/	a)	=	½.	One	major	advantage	of	the	account	is	that	it	does	away	with	any	probabilistic	statement	in	the	consequent	–	it	in	fact	does	away	with	any	consequent	altogether.	The	probabilistic	manifestation	is,	as	it	were,	built	into	the	very	definition	of	the	propensity	instead.	This	makes	the	probabilistic	relation	between	a	and	b	conspicuous:	it	brings	to	the	fore	that	these	two	propositions	share	a	probabilistic	rather	than	a	propositional	or	logical	structure.			The	account	has	the	additional	advantage	to	bring	the	definition	of	chancy	propensities	in	line	with	the	ordinary	cognitive	order:	we	tend	to	learn	conditional	probabilities	first,	and	often	possess	precise	knowledge	of	conditional	chances	while	lacking	any	knowledge	of	the	unconditional	chances.	Thus	I	may	not	know	whether	it	will	rain	tomorrow,	but	I	do	know	that	with	high	probability	my	son	will	visit	me	if	it	rains	(since	we	have	so	agreed	beforehand).	Or	consider	the	application	of	our	very	precise	theoretical	knowledge	of	radioactive	half-lives	to	an	actual	mixed	sample	of	radioactive	material.	If	we	do	not	know	the	proportions	in	the	mixture	with	any	certainty,	we	cannot	know	the	actual	rate	of	decay,	but	this	in	no	way	impugns	our	very	precise	knowledge	of	the	half-lives	for	each	of	the																																																																																																																																																																			propensities	in	particular,	since	the	least	that	we	can	require	for	a	propensity	is	a	definite	value	of	the	probability	that	it	ascribes	to	the	manifestation	property.	
	 12	
radioactive	elements	that	make	up	the	mixture.	And	as	we	gain	experimental	knowledge	of	the	actual	rates	of	decay	we	can	come	to	estimate	rather	precisely	the	composition	of	the	mixture	from	the	conditional	chances	of	decay.	It	does	not	seem	farfetched	to	think	that	at	least	in	some	cases	and	contexts,	we	may	estimate	the	prevalence	of	certain	propensities	in	a	system	from	our	knowledge	of	the	conditional	chances.	Thus	a	system	of	coins	tossed	at	random	may	exhibit	certain	frequencies	that	we	can	experimentally	determine	and	then	go	on	to	use	these	to	discern	the	makeup	of	the	system	in	terms	of	coins	with	definite	distinct	propensities.				 However,	the	conditional	probability	account	also	faces	very	serious	problems	related	to	what	is	known	in	the	literature	as	“Humphreys’	paradox”	(Humphreys	[1985],	[2004]).	The	problems	are	by	now	well-known	so	I	will	not	describe	them	in	full	detail.	In	particular,	we	may	distinguish	two	identity	theses	between	propensities	and	conditional	probabilities,	which	I	have	referred	to	in	the	past	as	the	probability-to-propensity	and	propensity-to-probability	theses	(Suárez	[2013],	[2014]).	Both	are	interestingly	false,	but	only	the	latter	is	relevant	to	the	present	analysis.	The	propensity-to-probability	thesis	states	that	any	propensity	may	be	understood	as	a	conditional	probability	where	the	manifestation	property	is	adjudicated	a	probability	conditional	on	the	obtaining	of	the	propensity	(more	precisely:	a	conditional	probability	distribution	is	laid	out	over	the	values	of	the	manifestation	property	conditional	on	the	propensity	–	just	as	required	by	what	I	have	here	called	the	conditional	account	of	propensities).				 Humphreys	disproves	the	propensity-to-probability	thesis	by	means	of	an	ingenious	thought	experiment	(Humphreys	[1985],	pp.	561ff.)	involving	photons	ejected	from	a	source	at	time	t0,	impinging	upon	a	half-silver	mirror	at	time	t1,	and	transferred	and	received	at	some	further	screen	at	time	t2.	Humphreys	describes	the	propensities	in	the	thought	experiment	in	detail	and	denotes	them	in	accordance	to	the	propensity-to-probability	thesis	as	conditional	probabilities.	He	then	adds	a	principle	of	conditional	independence,	which	is	meant	to	reflect	the	thought	that	propensities	do	not	act	backwards	in	time	(at	least	to	the	extent	that	causes	do	not	act	backwards	in	time).	That	is	to	say	that	events	at	times	t1	or	t2	
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may	not	affect	the	propensities	enacted	at	time	t0.	Humphreys	then	shows	that	the	propensities	in	the	experiment,	expressed	as	conditional	probabilities,	together	with	conditional	independence	come	into	conflict	with	Kolmogorov’s	axioms,	and	in	particular	Bayes’	Theorem,	or	the	definition	of	conditional	probability.	This	means	that	if	chances	are	to	be	essentially,	or	implicitly,	defined	by	Kolmogorov’s	axioms,	the	conditional	probability	account	of	propensities	(the	propensity-to-probability	
half	of	the	identity	thesis)	must	be	abandoned.	9	In	other	words,	no	conditional	probability	account	of	the	relation	between	propensities	and	their	chancy	manifestations	can	be	made	to	work	in	general.					
3. The	Indexed	Probability	Account	of	Propensities			 Humphreys’	‘paradox’	thus	shows	implicitly	that	any	attempt	to	include	the	propensity	attribution	event	in	the	domain	of	the	chance	function	itself	is	bound	to	fail.	The	obvious	response	is	to	take	the	propensity	properties	out	of	the	domain	of	the	chance	or	probability	function	altogether.	And	it	so	happens	that	the	obvious	response	has	a	lot	going	for	it.	On	the	assumption	that	propensities	are	distinct	from	the	chances	that	display	them,	the	introduction	of	the	propensity	attribution	events	inside	the	chance	function	is	counter-intuitive	anyway.	Every	propensity	is	in	effect	the	condition	that	determines	the	chances	of	its	manifestation	properties.	But	propensities	do	not	determine	their	own	chances.	That	is,	every	propensity	in	each	chance	set-up	determines	a	probability	distribution	over	its	possible	manifestation	properties,	or	outcomes;	and	this	probability	precisely	represents	the	chance	that	displays	the	propensity.	But	of	course	this	is	not	itself	the	chance	of	the	propensity	attribution	event.	It	makes	no	sense	for	a	propensity	to	lay	out	a	
																																																								9	The	argument	relies	on	the	Kolmogorov	axiomatization	of	classical	probability,	and	some	authors	have	suggested	that	a	possible	way	to	restore	the	conditional	probability	account	of	propensities	would	be	to	reject	the	Kolmogorov	axioms,	in	particular	the	ratio	analysis	of	conditional	probability.	There	are	good	independent	arguments	against	ratio	anyway	(Hájek	[2003]).	However,	the	only	respectable	alternative	to	Kolmogorov	so	far	is	(Renyi	[1953]),	which	turns	out	to	be	subject	to	similar	Humphreys-like	objections	as	an	account	of	propensities	(Lyons	[2014]).			
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probability	over	itself	–	amongst	other	things	because	it	would	be	radically	incoherent	if	it	were	to	adjudicate	itself	a	probability	zero.	10			 The	indexed	probability	account	of	propensities	is	faithful	and	explicit	about	the	irreflexive	nature	of	the	relation	between	propensities	and	their	displays.	If	a	is	the	propensity	and	Prob	(b)	is	the	chance	that	a	defines	over	the	possible	outcome	events	b,	the	indexed	probability	account	represents	this	relation	as	Proba	(b)	or	Pa	(b),	so	there	can	be	no	doubt	that	the	attribution	of	the	propensity	itself	lies	outside	the	domain	of	the	chance	or	probability	function.	This	is	a	probability	function	defined	by	construction	over	the	outcomes	of	the	manifestation	property,	and	explicitly	not	over	the	propensity	property,	which	figures	in	the	index.	In	other	words,	there	is	no	joint	probability	of	a	propensity	and	its	manifestation	–	the	probability	of	this	joint	event	is	not	even	zero,	it	is	simply	ill	defined.	Furthermore,	different	propensity	properties	may	define	different	probability	distributions	over	the	same	manifestation	outcomes.	Hence	the	propensity	(a)	of	a	fair	coin	determines	a	probability	½	for	heads	(b),	and	similarly	for	tails.	The	very	same	coin	may	be	altered	so	that	it	(c)	determines	a	very	different	probability	(chance)	for	either	heads	or	tails	(the	coin	is	loaded).	11	Therefore	in	general	Pa	(b)	≠	Pc	(b),	for	the	very	same	object	or	set-up	if	endowed	with	different	propensities	a	and	c.		The	account	easily	answers	the	objections	that	make	its	competitors	untenable.	First,	the	indexed	probability	account	avoids	the	pitfalls	of	the	conditionals	account,	in	particular	it	does	not	follow	that	any	absent	propensities	entail	the	chances	whatever	those	chances	are.	More	generally,	we	are	not	to	understand	propensities	as	antecedents	in	conditionals	with	chances	in	their	consequents.	The																																																									10	The	view	that	propensities	are	distinct	from	the	chances	that	display	them	has	been	suggested	before	–	e.g.	by	Mellor	([1971],	Ch.	4).	The	additional	thought	that	propensities	are	explanatory	of	chances	has	also	been	echoed	in	the	literature	–	implicitly	at	least	since	Peirce	([1878]).	11	See	Keller	([1986])	for	a	review	of	the	dynamics	of	coin	tossing,	and	the	rather	curious	fact	that	it	can	be	modelled	by	means	of	two	parameters	(upwards	velocity	
v,	and	angular	velocity	w	as	it	is	tossed	in	the	air)	that	are	independent	of	the	coin’s	centre	of	gravity.	Thus	one	can	bias	a	coin	by	bending	it,	but	not	by	altering	the	symmetry	of	its	mass	/	weight	distribution	as	is	commonly	thought.	
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relation	between	a	propensity	and	its	display	is	not	in	general	provided	by	a	conditional	statement,	and	therefore	does	not	rely	upon	the	appropriate	semantics	for	such	statements.	So	no	quandaries	or	disputes	regarding	the	semantics	of	conditionals	may	detain	us.	In	particular,	we	do	not	need	to	determine	the	truth	conditions	of	a	counterfactual	conditional	across	any	possible	worlds.			 Second,	as	for	the	objections	to	the	conditional	probability	account,	deriving	from	Humphreys’	paradox,	the	indexed	probability	account	avoids	them	entirely,	since	it	does	not	model	the	relation	of	propensities	and	chances	in	terms	of	conditional	probability.	On	the	contrary,	indexes	are	introduced	precisely	in	order	to	avoid	any	conditional	probability	representation,	so	there	can	be	no	issues	regarding	the	interpretation	of	inverse	conditional	probabilities.	In	particular,	note	that	the	fact	that	Proba	(b)	is	well	defined	in	no	way	entails	that	Probb	(a)	is	also	well	defined.	The	manifestation	property	may	be	included	in	the	domain	of	the	chance	or	probability	function	that	displays	the	propensity	without	in	any	way	requiring	that	any	chance	distribution	that	in	turn	displays	the	manifestation	property	includes	in	its	domain	the	propensity	property	that	gave	rise	to	it.	Suppose	that	we	toss	a	fair	coin	and	agree	to	release	a	radioactive	material	in	the	environment	only	if	the	coin	lands	heads.	The	propensity	of	the	fair	coin	is	displayed	in	the	chance	of	heads	(as	Proba	(b)	=	½),	and	the	event	of	this	particular	coin	landing	heads	determines	the	chance	that	the	radioactive	material	has	of	decaying	in	the	environment	in	the	next	hour.	But	the	event	of	landing	heads	has	no	propensity	to	determine	whether	or	not	the	coin	is	fair.	It	cannot	determine	the	chance	of	its	being	a	fair	coin	because	a	is	not	in	the	domain	of	the	Probb	function	so	Probb	(a)	is	not	defined.	There	is	no	reason	why	the	generating	conditions	or	propensities	displayed	in	a	chance	distribution	should	themselves	receive	a	chance	value	under	that	distribution.			 Furthermore,	if	either	a	conditional	or	conditional	probability	account	were	in	fact	applicable	to	a	particular	propensity	ascription	(in	line	with	suggestions	to	the	effect	in	the	previous	sections),	they	would	be	easily	brought	under	the	indexed	probability	account.	More	precisely,	the	propensities	they	capture	would	be	easily	shown	to	display	indexed	probabilities	after	all.	The	indexed	account	is	
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sufficiently	deflationary,	in	requiring	simply	that	chances	be	indexed	to	the	propensities	that	they	display,	regardless	of	any	logical,	causal,	or	probabilitistic	relations	that	obtain.	So	the	indexed	account	has	then	the	following	significant	advantage:	It	applies	always,	including	whenever	no	other	account	applies,	but	also	whenever	any	other	accounts	does.	It	is	in	other	words	the	only	account	that	applies	to	all	propensities	in	their	relation	to	their	chancy	manifestations,	independently	of	any	other	details	or	commitments.			 As	an	illustration	consider	how	the	reduction	would	go	in	the	case	of	a	sophisticated	conditional	account	which	applied	to	a	particular	propensity	R	and	manifestation	property	D	as:	
€ 
∀x Rx →Ch Dt x( ) = pt( ) .	Since	the	conditional	takes	the	form	already	discussed:	if	a	then	Prob	(b),	we	need	only	turn	this	into	the	corresponding	indexed	probability	formulation:	Proba	(b)=x,	where	a=R,	and	b=D.	The	only	loss	of	generality	incurred	is	the	actual	conditional	statement.	Nothing	as	regards	the	propensity	or	the	chance	that	displays	it	is	in	any	way	distinct:	The	possession	of	R	is	what	explains	and	grounds	the	chance	at	time	t,	and	this	is	best	represented	on	the	account	here	defended	as	the	indexed	function:	ProbR	(Dt)	=	p.	Thus	in	the	example	discussed	of	the	radium	atom,	the	solution	is	to	write:	
€ 
ChR Dt x( ) = p,	where	we	simply	truncate	the	chance	function	for	the	value	of	the	chance	of	decay	of	radium	atoms	in	particular.				 The	indexed	probability	account	of	propensities	does	not	require	an	understanding	of	the	relation	between	propensities	and	their	chancy	manifestations	as	logical	consequence,	conditional	entailment,	or	any	other	form	of	propositional	implication	(it	is	rather	better	conceived	of	as	a	kind	of	explanatory	‘grounding’),	but	it	certainly	allows	such	an	understanding	whenever	appropriate.	Similarly,	for	the	conditional	probability	account,	whenever	applicable:	A	non-Kolmogorov	(i.e.	non	invertible)	conditional	probability	Prob	(b	/	a)	can	always	be	transformed	into	an	absolute	indexed	probability	Proba	(b)	without	any	loss	of	generality	or	information	other	than	the	problematic	assignment	of	a	probability	to	the	propensity	a	(or	any	complex	event	that	results	out	of	the	logical	combinations	of	a,	including	its	conjunction	with	another	event,	such	as	a	&	b).	And	
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just	as	a	non-Kolmogorov	probability	is	not	automatically	invertible,	the	corresponding	indexed	probability	is	also	not	automatically	invertible.	So	an	indexed	probability	can,	within	context,	also	be	standing	for	a	conditional	non-Kolmogorovian	probability.	In	other	words,	the	function	ChR	(or	Proba	more	generally)	is	itself	relative	to	context:	It	may	sometimes	be	coding	in	for	a	conditional,	other	times	for	a	non-invertible	conditional	probability,	and	yet	in	other	cases	it	is	entirely	sui	generis.			
4. Indexed	Chance	Functions:	History	and	Comparisons			 The	claim	that	chance	functions	are	indexed	functions	is	not	in	itself	new,	although	the	thought	that	they	are	indexed	to	propensities	certainly	is.		Thus	chance	is	commonly	understood	to	be	relative	to	time,	and	the	functions	that	represent	chance	therefore	carry	a	(sometimes	implicit)	time	index.	On	the	Humean	approach	defended	by	David	Lewis,	for	example,	chance	is	a	function	of	the	entire	state	or	history	of	the	world	up	to	a	certain	time,	i.e.	ChHt	(x),	where	Ht	is	the	history	of	the	world	w	up	to	time	t.		Chance	is	thus	both	world	and	time	relative	(Lewis	[1986],	p.	91).	Contemporary	Humeans	who	defend	a	best	system	account	of	chance	(such	as	Hoefer	[2007])	also	tend	to	conceive	of	chance	as	relative	to	time,	since	the	best	system	laws	that	determine	the	chances	are	typically	dynamical	laws	parametrized	with	respect	to	time.		Thus	the	best	system	law	L	determines	or	entails	the	chances	for	all	chancy	propositions	at	every	instant	in	their	temporal	evolution:
€ 
∀P∀t : L Cht P( )( )→Cht P( ) = xt .	The	crucial	point	is	that	in	accordance	with	the	law	the	chance	of	a	proposition	P	need	not	be	the	same	at	two	different	times	t,	t’,	but	it	will	typically	differ:	Cht	(P)	≠	Cht’	(P).	Indeed	most	Humeans	believe	that	the	chances	of	all	past	events	are	either	zero	or	one,	including	those	events	endowed	with	non-zero	chances	at	any	particular	past	time	relative	to	the	event	in	question.	Thus	a	fair	coin	about	to	be	tossed	has	chance	½	of	landing	heads,	but	once	tossed	the	chance	of	it	landing	heads	properly	becomes	either	one	or	zero	at	landing	(and	stays	so	afterwards).	This	patently	requires	implicitly	or	explicitly	indexing	every	chance	function	to	a	point	in	time	in	the	evolution	of	the	world	(or	a	time-slice	thereof).		
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		 The	contemporary	Humean	accounts	already	understand	chance	to	be	an	indexed	function	with	respect	to	both	a	time	t	and	a	world	w.	My	proposal	is	not	incompatible	with	these	accounts,	but	it	aims	to	go	further	in	indexing	chance	functions	not	only	to	their	time	slices	at	their	worlds,	but	to	whatever	propensity	they	display	or	manifest	as	well	at	that	time	in	that	world.	Hence	I	am	not	proposing	to	substitute	propensity	indexes	in	place	of	the	conventional	Humean	indexes,	but	rather	to	add	a	further	index	to	those	chances	that	display	some	underlying	propensity.	(The	proposal	does	not	even	require	that	all	chances	display	propensities,	although	it	is	natural	to	think	that	all	objective	chances	in	fact	do.	But	generality	cannot	do	any	harm:	If	objective	chances	exist	that	are	not	the	display	of	underlying	propensities,	the	index	would	simply	remain	empty,	or	unsaturated,	without	loss	of	generality.)			 Carl	Hoefer	([2007],	pp.	564ff.)	comes	close	to	the	indexed	account	in	his	discussion	of	what	he	calls	stochastic	nomological	machines	(SNMs),	which	he	describes	as	‘stable,	macroscopic	chances	that	supervene	on	the	overall	pattern	[and]	are	explicable	as	regularities	guaranteed	by	the	structure	of	the	assumed	chance	setup’	([2007],	p.	564).	With	the	exception	of	the	claim	of	supervenience	upon	the	Humean	mosaic,	there	is	nothing	in	this	statement	that	a	propensity	theorist	would	object	to.	Hoefer	even	employs	the	appropriate	terminology	in	the	statement	of	his	stochasticity	postulate	(SP,	a	postulate	that	is	also	as	acceptable	to	a	propensity	theorist	as	to	any	Humean):	‘At	many	levels	of	scale	(but	especially	micro-scale),	events	look	“stochastic”	or	“random”,	with	a	certain	stable	distribution	over	time;	this	fact	is	crucial	to	the	grounding	of	many	objective	chances’	(Hoefer	[2007],	p.	563,	my	italics).	While	I	welcome	the	emphasis	on	the	grounding	of	objective	chances,	the	Humean	best	system	analysis	of	chance	defended	by	Hoefer	only	describes	chances	as	regularities	that	supervene	on	the	Humean	mosaic	(which	Hoefer	is	happy	to	extend	beyond	mere	spatiotemporal	coincidences	at	the	microphysical	level	to	include	factual	occurring	events	at	‘higher’	levels).	It	does	not	illuminate	the	explanatory	relation	that	SNM’s	hold	to	
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the	chances.	12	Yet,	the	relation	between	the	propensities	of	SNM’s	and	chances	is	precisely	the	central	focus	of	the	present	essay.	How	does	the	modal	content	of	the	propensities	operative	in	SNM’s	and	the	chances	that	they	putatively	explain	relate?	It	seems	to	me	that	no	Humean	account	of	this	relation	can	be	provided	on	pain	of	circularity	–	since	it	would	necessarily	incur	further	regularities,	whose	stability	will	in	turn	require	explaining	by	tracing	to	some	SNM	or	chance	setup.	The	present	discussion	is	an	attempt	to	provide	a	basic	framework	for	a	more	promising	inquiry	into	the	nature	of	this	grounding	relation.	13			 There	are	other,	more	recent,	claims	to	the	effect	that	chances	are	indeed	relative	to	further	factors,	other	than	time-slices	at	particular	worlds.	Thus	(Glynn	[2010])	suggests	that	chances	are	relative	to	levels	of	description.		He	also	comes	close	to	suggesting	a	formal	indexing	model	to	deal	with	their	relative	factors.	In	particular	Glynn	([2010],	pp.	66ff.)	suggests	introducing	a	third	subscript	in	the	chance	function	for	any	proposition	P	as:	
€ 
Chltw P( ) .	This	would	index	each	chance	function	to	a	particular	time	(or	time	slice)	in	a	possible	world	at	a	particular	level	of	description.	14	By	‘levels’,	Glynn	has	in	mind	the	emergent	ontologies	of	different																																																									12	It	is	also	unclear	what	role	‘nomological	machines’	actually	play	in	Hoefer’s	argument.	The	term	was	introduced	by	Nancy	Cartwright	([2007])	to	describe	the	arrangement	of	capacities	in	an	organized	whole	that	thereby	yields	and	explains	lawful	observable	regularities.	But	as	far	as	I	can	see	nothing	in	Hoefer’s	argument	depends	on	chance	setups	being	construed	as	organized	arrays	of	capacity-endowed	parts.	Rather	the	appeal	to	an	explanatory	structured	chance	setup	is	fully	consistent	with	the	more	general	view	that	chances	are	grounded	in	whatever	propensities	chance	setups	possess,	regardless	of	their	composition	or	parts.	Also	capacities	in	general	do	not	ensue	or	ground	probabilities	or	chances,	while	propensities	always	do.	Hence,	I	stick	throughout	this	article	to	the	more	generic	and	conventional	terms	‘propensity’	and	‘chance	setup’	which	seem	to	me	fully	in	accord	with	the	functioning	content	in	Hoefer’s	definitions.			13	It	may	be	thought	that	Hoefer’s	claim	that	propensities	are	essentially	time-directed,	and	always	oriented	forwards	in	time	(see	e.g.	Hoefer,	2007,	p.	565;	or	Hoefer	[2011])	cuts	against	the	present	indexed	probability	account.	I	do	not	think	so.	I	see	no	reason	why	a	defender	of	propensities	cannot	countenance	backwards	in	time	propensities.	It	seems	to	me	that	what	is	actually	hard	to	countenance	is	backwards	in	time	chances,	but	i)	it	has	already	been	made	clear	that	the	indexed	account	from	the	start	distinguishes	chances	from	the	propensities	they	display,	and	ii)	even	the	claim	that	chances	are	always	time	directed	can	be	contested	(Cusbert	[2013]).	14	Another	difference	between	our	proposals	is	that	Glynn	seems	to	be	thinking	of	l,	
t,	and	w	as	variables	in	the	chance	function,	since	he	claims	chance	is	a	function	of	
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well-ordered	scientific	disciplines:	the	levels	of	microphysics,	macroscopic	statistical	physics,	physical	chemistry,	molecular	and	evolutionary	biology,	geology	and	geography,	psychology,	etc.	Thus	he	is	able	to	show	that	chances	at	higher	levels,	e.g.	in	genetics,	are	perfectly	compatible	with	an	underlying	deterministic	dynamics	at	say	the	microphysical	level.	As	an	approach	to	the	conceptual	compatibility	of	chance	and	determinism	this	is	thoroughly	convincing,	but	one	wonders	if	the	levels	are	always	well	defined,	and	if	their	hierarchy	is	always	uniquely	determined.	It	is	not	clear,	for	instance,	what	hierarchy	of	levels,	if	any,	operates	between	geology,	on	the	one	hand,	and	psychology	or	econometrics	on	the	other.	Once	the	reductionist	model	to	microphysical	chances	has	been	given	up,	there	is	no	obvious	hierarchical	order	among	the	remaining	chances	–	so	an	analysis	in	terms	of	‘levels’	seems	limited	to	only	those	disciplines	that	are	clearly	and	uniquely	ordered	in	their	ontologies.				 My	analysis	is	different	since	I	propose	to	consider	chances	in	their	relation	to	the	propensities	in	the	chance	set-ups	that	they	display,	whatever	level	these	propensities	operate	at.	This	has	the	advantage	over	Glynn’s	proposal	to	allow	for	cross-level	reductions.	For	instance,	to	reduce	thermodynamics	to	statistical	mechanics,	on	my	account,	would	be	tantamount	to	showing	how	thermodynamic	chances	or	qualities	emerge	from	statistical	mechanical	dynamical	properties;	to	reduce	biology	to	physics	would	be	tantamount	to	showing	how	biological	chances	are	grounded	upon	physical	propensities,	etc.	One	would	have	to	show,	in	other	words,	that	those	chances	would	appropriately	display	such	underlying	propensities	at	whatever	level	of	description.	The	proposal	to	index	chances	to	the	propensities	of	the	chance	set-up	thus	cuts	across	any	attempt	to	relativize	them	to	levels,	and	delivers	us	from	any	problematic	assumptions	regarding	reduction	or	emergence.			
																																																																																																																																																																		four	different	variables	overall	(the	fourth	one	being	the	proposition	that	receives	the	chance	in	question).	My	proposal	by	contrast	is	resolutely	opposed	to	considering	the	subscript	as	a	variable	in	the	chance	function.		It	does	not	suppose	that	propensities	are	a	function	of	chances,	or	vice-versa,	if	“function”	is	understood	in	its	precise	mathematical	sense.	
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	 So	while	my	thesis	is	similar	in	spirit	to	Glynn’s,	it	goes	somewhat	further	and	makes	‘levels’	redundant.	This	is	because	propensities	already	implicitly	fix	the	level	of	description.	I	am	assuming	that	propensities	are	the	properties	of	chance	set-ups	that	ground	and	explain	the	chances	that	display	them	–	and	therefore	should	not	be	identified	with	them.	(I	take	it	to	be	a	platitude	about	explanation,	whatever	its	precise	form,	that	nothing	can	explain	that	which	it	is	identical	with).	We	don’t	explain	the	chances	of	coins	by	appealing	to	quantum	mechanical	propensities,	but	by	appealing	to	ordinary	properties	of	macroscopic	(classical-mechanical)	objects	like	coins.	Similarly,	we	explain	biological	chances,	e.g.	of	reproduction	or	inheritance,	by	appealing	to	dispositional	biological	properties	such	as	fitness	variation,	heritability,	etc.,	within	evolutionary	theory	(Sober	[2013]).	And	we	explain	quantum	mechanical	chances	by	referring	to	a	theory	(quantum	mechanics)	postulating	microscopic	entities,	properties,	and	dynamics	at	the	sub-atomic	level.	Therefore,	a	chance	that	is	indexed	to	a	propensity	is	ipso	facto	also	indexed	to	a	specific	level	of	description,	often	one	provided	by	a	particular	scientific	theory	at	that	level.	There	is	thus	no	need	for	any	ulterior	reference	to	levels	in	identifying	chances.				 	
5. Some	Features	of	the	Indexed	Probability	Account			 The	indexed	account	of	chancy	dispositions,	or	propensities	is	deflationary	since	it	does	not	build	any	significant	theory	of	the	relation	between	propensities	and	the	chances	that	display	them.	It	in	particular	does	not	assume	that	propensities	cause	their	displays.	Yet,	it	has	some	striking	formal	consequences	and	features.	Perhaps	most	striking	is	the	asymmetry	between	indexes	and	variables	in	the	chance	function.	A	propensity	(a)	determines	a	probability	or	chance	distribution	over	its	manifestation	property	(b)	but	b	does	not	thereby	determine	a	probability	distribution	over	a.	This	is	the	sense	in	which	propensities	share	the	asymmetry	of	causation,	as	has	often	been	noted.	The	grounding	of	chances	in	propensities	is	in	this	respect	like	causation,	yet	it	does	not	follow	that	propensities	always	or	ever	cause	their	manifestations,	or	that	the	manifestation	relation	is	in	some	essential	way	causal.	In	other	words,	the	indexed	probability	
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account	reveals	clearly	that	the	asymmetry	of	propensities	is	sui	generis:	it	is	built	into	its	formal	representation	ab	initio.	Although	sometimes	the	asymmetry	may	coincide	with	a	causal	one	(some	propensities	may	cause	their	chance	manifestations)	this	need	not	be	the	case	in	general.	The	coin’s	propensity	is	not	necessarily	a	cause	of	its	landing	heads	in	any	particular	case	(and	at	any	rate	it	is	certainly	not	the	total	cause).	Nor	does	it	seem	plausible	to	suppose	that	it	causes	the	chance	½	in	a	fair	coin.	Rather	for	a	toss	of	the	coin	to	have	the	single	case	chance	½	the	coin	must	be	fair.	This	propensity	is	what	the	single	case	chance	amounts	to.	Note	that	this	seems	in	line	with	dispositions	and	their	manifestations	in	general,	including	sure-fire	or	deterministic	dispositions.	It	would	be	odd	to	say	that	the	fragility	of	a	glass	caused	its	breakage,	but	it	seems	clear	nevertheless	that	there	is	an	explanatory	asymmetry:	the	breakage	cannot	explain	the	fragility	but	the	fragility	is	certainly	often	invoked	to	explain	the	breakage.				 A	second	important	feature	worth	emphasizing	is	this:	Nothing	in	the	indexed	account	prevents	nested	propensities.	A	propensity	a	does	not	fix	a	chance	or	probability	distribution	over	itself,	only	over	its	manifestation	property	outcomes	b,	as	Proba	(b);	but	this	does	not	entail	that	a	cannot	in	turn	be	the	result	of	some	further	propensity	w.	That	is,	there	may	be	a	further	propensity	c	that	has	
b	as	its	manifestation	such	that	Probc	(b)	=	x.	Thus	building	on	our	example,	a	coin-generating	machine	may	have	a	certain	propensity	c	to	produce	a	fair	coin	b	which	in	turn	has	a	certain	chance	a	of	landing	heads	when	tossed.	In	other	words,	the	indexed	account	does	not	require	the	manifestation	property	to	be	categorical	–	it	too	can	be	a	dispositional	property.	In	fact,	all	properties	on	this	account	may	be	dispositions,	or	propensities:	There	could	be	propensities	all	the	way	down.				 Thirdly,	propensities	may	combine	and	interfere	with	each	other,	constructively	or	destructively.	Thus	suppose	that	two	propensities	a	and	b	independently	determine	chances	distributions	over	the	values	of	some	manifestation	property	c	as	Proba	(ci)	and	Probb	(ci)	where	Proba	(ci)	≠	Probb	(ci)	at	least	for	some	ci.	The	joint	action	of	both	may	then	be	defined	as	Proba&b	(ci)	and	it	is	constructive	for	a	if	Proba&b	(ci)	≥	Proba	(ci)	and	constructive	for	b	if	Proba&b	(ci)	
≥	Probb	(ci);	otherwise	it	is	destructive	(for	either	a	or	b).	For	instance,	a	loaded	
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coin	with	a	greater	than	equal	chance	of	heads	constructively	interacts	with	a	more	intense	gravitational	field	to	make	it	more	likely	that	the	coin	lands	heads	when	tossed	in	that	environment.	And	it	destructively	interacts	with	the	field	with	respect	to	tails	to	make	it	less	likely	that	it	will	land	tails.				 Finally,	the	indexed	probability	account	has	implications	for	David	Lewis’	principal	principle	(PP).	The	original	formulation	of	this	principle	(Lewis,	[1986],	p.	87)	appears	to	be	unconditional.	It	asserts	that	for	any	reasonable	initial	credence	function	Cr,	at	any	time,	the	chance	Ch	(A)	at	that	time	of	some	proposition	A	in	light	of	all	admissible	evidence	E	should	fix	the	credence:	
€ 
Cr A Ch A( ) = x( )& E( ) = x .	It	quickly	became	clear	that	PP	is	nonetheless	implicitly	conditional.	It	is	first	of	all	conditional	on	time	since	both	the	credence	function	(Cr)	and	the	chance	function	(Ch)	are	understood	at	a	particular	time	t.	In	accordance	to	the	indexed	probability	account,	both	should	properly	carry	an	index.	Furthermore,	the	chance	function	is	to	be	evaluated	at	a	particular	world,	since	on	a	Humean	account	this	function	is	highly	sensitive	the	local	matters	of	fact	at	that	world.	And	indeed	Lewis	himself	formulates	the	principle	for	an	indexed	chance	function	as	follows	(Lewis	[1986],	p.	97):	
€ 
Chtw A( ) = Cr A HtwTw( ) ,	where	
€ 
Chtw A( ) 	is	the	probability	of	A	that	obtains	at	time	t	in	world	w;	Htw	is	the	history	of	the	world	w	up	to	time	t;	and	Tw	is	the	theory	of	chance	in	world	w	(i.e.	the	entire	set	of	true	history-to-chance	conditionals	in	this	world).		We	may	refer	to	this	as	the	original,	or	old,	principal	principle	(PPold),	which	Lewis	abandoned	(Lewis	[1994]),	under	pressure	from	the	so-called	problem	of	undermining	futures,	in	favour	of	one	he	called	the	new	principal	principle	(PPnew):
€ 
Chtw A Tw( ) = Cr A HtwTw( ) .	The	crucial	difference	is	that	according	to	PPnew,	the	chance	of	the	proposition	A	is	also	conditional	upon	the	right	theory	of	chance	Tw	(the	true	history	to	chance	at	world	w).	From	the	perspective	of	the	approach	defended	in	this	paper,	the	move	seems	unwarranted,	and	possibly	a	mistake.	Since	the	theory	of	chance	at	world	w	contains	all	the	propensities	at	world	w,	it	should	never	appear	in	the	domain	of	the	chance	or	probability	function	at	all,	but	should	rather	appear	in	the	index	of	the	chance	function.	The	appropriate	version	of	the	principal	principle	for	propensities	(PPprop)		would	be	the	following	
	 24	
statement	instead.	PPprop	:	
€ 
ChTw (A) = Cr A HtwTw( ).	PPprop	states	that,	in	the	absence	of	any	inadmissible	information	about	the	future,	conditional	credences	at	time	t	track	the	chances	displayed	by	the	propensities	that	ground	them	up	to	time	t.	15			
6. Grounds	and	Indexes	for	Propensities			 The	relationship	between	propensities	and	their	chance	manifestations	is	thus	not	provided	by	conditionals	–	it	is	not	so	much	a	logical	relation	between	statements	or	propositions	as	an	explanatory	relation	between	certain	properties	of	objects	or	chance	setups	and	their	displayed	outcomes.		Nor	is	it	an	essentially	causal	relation,	although	it	shares	many	of	the	features	of	a	causal	relation,	such	as	asymmetry,	interference,	etc.	It	is	not	causal	in	general	because	it	does	not	seem	in	general	correct	that	dispositions	are	the	causes	of	their	chancy	manifestations.		Thus,	consider	the	archetypical	dispositional	‘fragility’;	we	would	very	reluctantly	take	this	to	be	a	cause	of	the	breaking	of	any	particular	fragile	object.		The	cause	of	the	object	breaking	may	be	our	throwing	it	down	on	the	floor	with	sufficient	strength,	etc.	Its	fragility	is	rather	more	akin	to	a	background	condition:	it	is	a	fact	conducive	to,	or	facilitating	of,	the	actual	breaking	but	it	is	not	its	cause.		Dispositions	are	pre-conditions	for	the	causes	that	bring	about	their	manifestations,	but	do	not	seem	to	be	themselves	those	causes.				 More	particularly,	the	relation	is	not	causal	in	the	following	two	senses:	i)	propensities	do	not	cause	the	chances	that	display	them;	ii)	chances	do	not	cause	the	propensities	they	display.	It	is	not	causal	in	the	latter	sense	because	chances	do	not	routinely	explain	propensities,	but	the	other	way	round	(and	we	do	not	suppose	effects	to	explain	their	causes).	And	it	is	not	causal	in	the	former	sense	because	even	though	it	is	correct	to	say	that	propensities	are	the	explanatory	
																																																								15	This	reformulation	of	the	principal	principle	is	incidentally	in	line	with	Ismael’s	([2008])	convincing	argument	against	including	the	theory	of	chance	in	the	domain	of	the	chance	function	in	PPnew.	But	while	Ismael	has	to	work	hard	to	make	the	point	on	behalf	of	the	Humean,	the	propensity	theory	of	indexed	chance	defended	in	this	paper	has	it	as	a	straightforward	if	not	trivial	consequence.	
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grounds	of	the	chances	that	display	them,	they	are	not	so	in	virtue	of	any	causal	relation.	What	could	this	explanatory	grounding	relation	then	be?			 It	is	instructive	at	this	point	to	consider	the	recent	literature	on	‘grounds’	(Fine	[2000]).	A	property	or	set	of	properties	{P}	is	the	grounds	for	another	property	T	if	and	only	if	T	being	the	case	consists	in,	or	amounts	to,	{P}	being	the	case.		Fine	puts	the	matter	in	terms	of	propositions	being	true	(Fine	[2000],	p.	15),	but	that	marks	no	significant	difference	for	my	purposes	here.	Thus	in	Fine’s	example:	‘Its	being	the	case	that	Britain	and	Germany	were	at	war	in	1940	consists	in	nothing	more	than	“…”	where	“…”	is	a	compendious	description	of	the	warring	activities	of	various	individuals’.	Fine	argues	that	‘grounds’	so	understood	are	not	causal	relations	or	bases;	it	is	not	the	case	that	the	set	{P}	is	the	set	of	causes	of	T:	the	set	of	individual	actions	during	the	war	did	not	cause	the	war,	it	was	rather	what	the	war	consisted	in.	Nor	is	the	relation	one	of	logical	entailment	or	analysis:	the	set	{P}	is	not	the	analytical	sum	of	all	that	which	makes	up	the	war:	those	individual	actions	during	the	war	is	what	the	war	consisted	in,	but	they	do	not	provide	an	analytical	definition	of	the	war.	For	a	start	the	actions	are	not	logically	entailed	by	the	war	(or	vice-versa).	Instead	the	relation	is,	according	to	Fine,	essentially	explanatory:	grounds	are	the	‘most	metaphysically	satisfying’	(Fine	[2000],	p.	22)	explanatory	link	that	we	may	provide	for	a	fact,	proposition,	property,	or	condition.			 This	seems	apposite	for	our	purposes	and	it	fits	in	well	with	the	distinctions	that	I	have	been	drawing	so	far.	I	have	been	assuming	throughout	that	propensities	are	distinguished	ontologically	as	the	grounds	for	the	chances	that	display	them;	and	that	this	is	an	explanatory	and	asymmetric	relation.	The	question	here,	recall,	is	not	about	the	nature	of	the	frequency	data,	or	even	some	long	run	or	limiting	feature	of	this	frequency.	The	question	pertains	to	the	single	case	chance	that	on	this	view	displays	the	propensity	of	a	fair	coin	in	every	single	tossing	event.	What	does	the	chance	ascription	amount	to?	I	suggest	that	a	particular	single	case	chance	of	a	possible	outcome	of	a	manifestation	property	b:	Proba	(b),	consists	in	the	having	or	possessing	of	the	corresponding	propensity	by	the	chance	set	up	that	yields	it.	Thus	what	it	means	for	a	single	toss	of	a	fair	coin	to	have	the	chance	=	½	
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to	land	heads	is	that	the	coin	possesses	the	corresponding	propensity	(‘fairness’).	Yet,	this	relation	is	not	exactly	causal:	the	propensity	a	does	not	cause	the	probability	or	chance	distribution	over	this	manifestation	property,	Proba	(b).	Nor	does	a	relation	of	entailment	or	conditional,	whether	indicative	or	subjunctive,	obtain	between	them:	Propensities	do	not	provide	an	analytical	reduction	basis	for	chances.	Instead,	following	the	model	of	‘ground’,	we	may	say	that	the	single	case	chance	over	the	manifestation	condition	consists	in	(or	amounts	to)	nothing	but	possessing	the	propensity.		Moreover,	the	relation	is	explanatory,	in	an	extended	sense,	since	the	grounds	(propensities)	explain	the	chances.	Having	a	particular	propensity	(a)	to	land	heads	(b)	if	tossed	is	what	the	chance	Cha	(b)	consists	in.	The	possession	of	the	propensity	is	what	explains	the	particular	indexed	single	case	chance	displayed	in	that	particular	case.				 This	account	is	in	principle	applicable	only	to	objective	physical	chances,	i.e.	those	that	physical	theories	are	called	in	to	explain,	in	line	with	similar	claims	for	physical	dispositions.	Thus	the	fragility	of	a	glass,	regarded	as	a	chance	propensity,	may	not	cause	the	long	run	frequency	of	the	breaking	of	the	glass,	but	it	certainly	will	figure	in	its	explanation,	as	a	precondition	that	makes	it	possible	for	the	glass	to	break	in	the	proportion	in	which	it	does	long	term.		Similarly	the	propensities	that	ground	and	are	displayed	in	chances,	will	also	figure	in	the	explanation	of	the	long	run	frequencies	of	the	actual	manifestation	properties.				 There	remain	perhaps	a	few	questions	regarding	the	‘indexed’	nature	of	chancy	propensities.	I	have	claimed	that	the	best	representation	of	the	relation	between	propensities	and	the	chances	that	display	them	is	provided	by	indexed	probabilities.		One	may	wonder	to	what	extent	these	are	akin	to	‘indexicals’	in	the	philosophy	of	language.	After	all,	the	essential	link	to	the	propensity	a	that	grounds	it	turns	the	displaying	chance	Proba	(b)	into	a	property	of	the	manifestation	event	
relative	to	the	propensity	at	hand.	Let	me	explain:	I	toss	a	fair	coin	–	the	chance	of	heads	is	½.	This	chance	is	a	property	of	the	class	of	events	of	landing	heads,	but	it	is	so	relative	to	the	particular	propensity	of	the	coin	that	is	tossed.	If	I	manipulated	the	coin	by	subtly	biasing	it	(e.g.	by	slightly	bending	it),	I	would	thereby	change	the	propensities;	it	would	follow	that	the	chance	would	change,	and	may	no	longer	be	
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½;	let	us	suppose	it	is	now	Proba	(b)	=	1/3.	This	shows	that	different	propensities	ground	different	displaying	chances	(for	the	same	events).			 Yet	the	converse	is	also	true:	the	fair	coin	tossed	in	a	different	way	(say	by	a	mechanical	device	that	suitably	impressed	a	different	force	and	ensuing	trajectory	depending	on	the	initial	position	of	the	coin)	may	also	be	displayed	in	a	chance	different	from	½,	let	us	suppose	exactly	Proba’	(b)	=	1/3,	where	a’	is	the	crucially	different	propensity	of	the	coin	in	this	particular	chance	setup.	(There	is	an	issue	here,	which	I	must	put	to	the	side	for	the	moment,	as	to	whether	the	propensity	can	be	said	to	be	a	property	of	the	coin	only,	or	more	generally	of	the	coin	in	the	particular	chance	setup	at	hand;	but	note	that	whatever	view	we	take	it	generalizes	to	all	properties,	including	the	original	propensity	a,	as	well	as	the	new	a’).	In	effect,	two	coins	endowed	with	numerically	distinct	propensities	are	nonetheless	displayed	in	the	same	chance	distribution	over	the	same	events.	This	seems	to	come	into	conflict	with	‘grounding’,	since	the	chance	now	appears	to	be	grounded	in	different	propensities.	Hence	if	we	wish	to	maintain	the	claim,	as	I	do,	that	the	link	between	propensities	and	chances	is	one	of	explanatory	grounding	it	seems	that	we	are	forced	to	accept	that	the	chances	of	propensities	are	‘indexical’,	in	the	sense	that	they	are	essentially	linked	to	the	propensities	they	display.	Thus	the	equality:	Proba	(b)	=	1/3	=	Proba’	(b)	is	only	an	identity	of	numerical	values,	it	does	not	in	fact	identify	the	chances	themselves.	There	is	therefore	a	sense	in	which	chances	on	this	view	are	indexical	properties	in	their	relation	to	propensities.	16	The	statement	that	‘the	chance	of	such	and	such	a	coin	to	land	heads	is	½’	is	an	indexical	statement	in	the	sense	that	it	makes	an	implicit	reference	to	the	particular	propensity	that	it	displays	and	to	no	other.	17			 7.	Conclusions																																																									16	For	helpful	discussion	of	indexicals	see,	for	instance,	Braun	([2012]).	Note	that	the	only	sense	in	which	I	argue	above	that	propensities	are	like	indexicals	is	the	relativity	of	chances	to	the	underlying	propensities.	I	am	not	arguing	for	a	fuller	extent	of	the	analogy.	In	particular,	it	does	not	strike	me	that	the	semantics	of	‘chance’	is	indexical	in	the	way	in	which	the	semantics	of	‘this’	or	‘that’	is.	17	This	may	be	also	characterized	as	a	form	of	contextualism,	similar	to	the	view	defended	by	Handfield	and	Wilson	([2014])	for	Lewis’	chances.		
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		 I	have	assumed	throughout	this	essay	that	at	least	some	physical	chances	are	the	displays	of	underlying	propensities.	I	have	argued	that	the	best	account	of	this	displaying	relation	is	by	means	of	an	indexed	probability	functions.	Chances	are	relative	to	the	propensities	that	they	display,	just	as	they	are	relative	to	times,	worlds,	levels,	or	contexts.	The	account	is	contrasted	with	a	number	of	alternatives	such	as	the	conditional	and	conditional	probability	accounts.	Such	“conditionality”	accounts	suffer	from	some	essential	difficulties,	which	are	overcome	by	the	indexed	probability	account	(section	3).	A	number	of	consequences	and	features	of	this	account	were	then	outlined	(section	4),	including	the	derivation	of	a	novel	version	of	the	Lewis’	influential	principal	principle	appropriate	for	propensities.	In	the	final	section	of	the	paper,	I	tentatively	suggested	a	model	of	the	displaying	relation	as	minimal	metaphysical	grounding	which	makes	sense	of	the	explanatory	power	of	propensities.	I	also	showed	that	the	chances	that	display	propensities	have	some	of	the	characteristics	that	we	typically	ascribe	to	indexicals	–	in	particular	their	contextual	relativity.				
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